Islamic Terrorism in India

Most Muslims are not terrorists, but most terrorists are Muslims

Archive for August 25th, 2008

Indian Muslims: Where Have They Gone Wrong?

Posted by jagoindia on August 25, 2008


A Review of  Indian Muslims: Where Have They Gone Wrong? by Rafiq Zakaria

Kashmir Herald, Volume 4, No. 7 – May 2005
BOOK REVIEW: The road to amity
By Sreeram Chaulia

Few have steadfastly walked the thankless road to Hindu-Muslim harmony like Dr Rafiq Zakaria, one of India’s most ardent liberal thinkers. The theme of Zakaria’s 17th book is the nefarious role played by Muslim political leaders in impeding communal harmony before and after Indian independence.

M J Akbar, another rare specimen from the community of the enlightened, writes in the foreword that the flaw in Indian Muslim politics after 1857 was the minority complex based on the specious number game, the belief that Muslims, being only a quarter of the population, would always be subservient to Hindus. “Where have Indian Muslims gone wrong? Whenever they have forgotten their Indian roots.”

Zakaria takes the bull by the horns by dilating on how the present generation of Indian Muslims is suffering the consequences of erroneous steps taken by its leadership of yore and now. In the 1940s, Muslim elites “gave Muhammad Ali Jinnah all the support he needed” for partition of the South Asian subcontinent. After 1947, “they resorted to the same manner of confrontation with the dominant Hindus, widened the divide and intensified the hatred” (p xxviii). Ordinary Muslims were indoctrinated with a “ghetto mentality” and divorced from the national mainstream owing to “obstinate adherence to outmoded traditions” and fear of the ulama (clerical class).

Despite differences in the character of Islam and Hinduism, there was no move for partition in medieval times. Muslim rulers who persecuted Hindu subjects made no effort to divide territories on communal lines. Common Muslims and Hindus had largely cordial relations, celebrating each other’s festivals. Despite conflicts between ruling classes of the two communities, Indo-Saracenic art, music, literature and architecture flourished. Muslim poets, writers and philosophers “went into ecstasy over the secrets of human emancipation in the Bhagavad Gita” (p 38). Muslim musicians composed raagas in praise of the Hindu deities Krishna and Shiva. Urdu literature, from Amir Khusrau to Hasrat Mohani, bristled with respect for Hindu saints and spiritual precursors.

The real threat to India’s unity came from Jinnah’s “aggressive separatist stand”. His pernicious “two-nation theory” poisoned communal ties as never before. His campaign to frighten Muslims that Hindus would subjugate them to “abject slavery” or “complete annihilation” inflamed misunderstanding and passions. Thousands of Indian Muslims combated the communal virus. Badruddin Tyabjee, Rehmatulla Sayani, Shibli Nomani, M A Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Hussain Ahmad Madni, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Syed Abdullah Barelvi, Humayun Kabir et al risked the ire of their co-religionists to uphold oneness of all faiths. However, the British “kept Jinnah in the forefront in any negotiation and did not allow him to be isolated” (p 100). Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of British India, convinced Congress leaders that “the only way to get rid of Jinnah was a divided India. Any form of a united India would start a civil war” (p 115).

In the aftermath of partition, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru rushed to the rescue of innocent Muslim victims. His “anti-communalism was not one-sided. He fought Muslim communalism no less valiantly” (p 125). He opposed separate electorates and reservation of seats for minorities. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, was ever concerned about the psychosis through which Indian Muslims were passing. In her opinion, “Unless Muslims are made to feel that they are as much an integral part of India as Hindus, their attachment to secularism would remain hypocritical” (p 199).

The creation of Pakistan fueled Hindu-Muslim bitterness instead of easing it. Indian Muslims were more besieged than before 1947. Pakistan is “a constant threat to their safety and security in India”. Persecuted Bengali Muslims “had to be eventually rescued by Indian armed forces, consisting mostly of Hindus”. Average Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh still “groan under the iron heels of feudal cliques backed by the army” (p 162).

Zakaria strongly asserts that any solution of the Kashmir dispute on the lines desired by Pakistan will reopen the floodgates of vehement communalism. “The best way of silencing the Pakistanis and preserving Kashmir’s integration with India is to strengthen the link between Kashmiri Muslims and Indian Muslims” (p 405). Terrorism perpetrated in the name of jihad in Indian Kashmir is a major cause of Hindu-Muslim hostility. Zakaria cites Imam Ghazali, popular as the “Rejuvenator of Islam”: “If Muslims did not destroy terrorism, terrorism would destroy them” (p 203). To gloat over acts of terrorism and hold jashn (celebrations) depicts “utter crassness and lunacy”.

The economic condition of Indian Muslims is worse than that of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Muslims have as much to blame as the government for their own backwardness in education. They fail to capitalize on common facilities for educational uplift. Purdah (veiling women) and fear of coeducation deter female children’s progress in the secular world. Zakaria urges Indian Muslims to cooperate with Hindus through intensive contact on a daily basis. The former have “their place only in India and they have to get emotionally involved in her affairs, trends, ethos, conventions and traditions” (p 450).

Hatred can be overcome only by love. Since a generalized scare exists among Hindus that Muslims will demographically overtake them, Zakaria calls upon Muslims to eschew polygamy and adopt family planning vigorously. Triple talaaq (arbitrary divorce) and the hajj subsidy have to be abolished. The ostrich-like behavior of such leaders as Syed Shahabuddin and Imam Bukhari harms Muslims by keeping communal rancor alive. Hindus in turn have to live with 150 million Muslims, who cannot be wished away. Threats from the champions of Hindutva to eliminate Muslims have to cease.

Highlighting the more liberal facets of the lives of historical figures can clean mental cobwebs. Shivaji, the Maratha warrior king, had one-third Muslim soldiers in his army. The supreme commander of his navy was a Muslim. The first thing Shivaji did after a conquest was to promulgate protection of mosques and Muslim tombs. “He was more liberal and tolerant than the best of European potentates” (p 315). Swami Vivekananda, the apostle of humanism, saw the real unity of India in Hindu-Muslim goodwill in the villages and averred, “A junction of the two great systems – Vedanta brain and Islam body – is the only hope” (p 327).

The politics of hate is eating into the vitals of India, last demonstrated in the communal horrors of Gujarat. Zakaria takes the electronic media to task for its deep-rooted neglect of progressive Muslim viewpoints. It gives undue publicity to mullahs and fanatics. “If a Muslim demonstrates backwardness, it is news. If he exhibits progressiveness, it is not news” (p 356). The most evident barriers against improvement of Hindu-Muslim relations are riots. Governments and political parties treat them as law-and-order problems, without tying them to economic problems of livelihood among all religious communities.

Indian Muslims live in depressed conditions as hewers of wood and drawers of water, lacking a cogent middle class. Zakaria asks them to harness inner strengths and be self-reliant. “Give up asking for doles … never seek patronage” (p 427). The mindset of the community has to be transformed by “disarming terrorists and disowning bigotry” (p 464). Indian Muslim perception warrants sea changes. Religious prejudices and narrowness of spirit have to be won over by compassion of the likes of the greatest Sufi, Jalaluddin Rumi:

Then listen! I am lover of love
My love transcends all creeds

Suffused with Urdu, Persian and Hindi poetry, Zakaria’s erudite publication will rate as yet another milestone in the peregrinations of the Indian Muslim caravan.

[Indian Muslims: Where Have They Gone Wrong? by Rafiq Zakaria. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, October 2004. ISBN: 81-7276-352-2. Price: US$11; 565 pages.]

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Posted in Hindus, India, Indian Muslims, Islam, Islamization, Islamofascism, Pakistan | 1 Comment »

Is Muslim immigration to Europe a conspiracy? – Oriana Fallaci

Posted by jagoindia on August 25, 2008


Oriana Fallaci asks: Is Muslim immigration to Europe a conspiracy?
LA Weekly ^ | Wednesday, March 15, 2006 | BRENDAN BERNHARD

Posted on Friday, March 17, 2006 3:00:36 AM by Leisler

In The Force of Reason, the controversial Italian journalist and novelist Oriana Fallaci illuminates one of the central enigmas of our time. How did Europe become home to an estimated 20 million Muslims in a mere three decades?

How did Islam go from being a virtual non-factor to a religion that threatens the preeminence of Christianity on the Continent? How could the most popular name for a baby boy in Brussels possibly be Mohammed? Can it really be true that Muslims plan to build a mosque in London that will hold 40,000 people? That Dutch cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam are close to having Muslim majorities? How was Europe, which was saved by the U.S. in world wars I and II, and whose Muslim Bosnians were rescued by the U.S. as recently as 1999, transformed into a place in which, as Fallaci puts it, “if I hate Americans I go to Heaven and if I hate Muslims I go to Hell?”

In attempting to answer these questions, the author, who is stricken with cancer and has been hounded by death threats and charges of “Islamophobia” (she is due to go on trial in France this June), has combined history with snatches of riveting firsthand reportage into a form that reads like a real-life conspiracy thriller.

If The Force of Reason sells a lot of copies, which it almost certainly will (800,000 were sold in Italy alone, and the book is in the top 100 on Amazon ), it will be not only because of the heat generated by her topic, but also because Fallaci speaks for the ordinary reader. There is no one she despises more than the intellectual “cicadas,” as she calls them — “You see them every day on television; you read them every day in the newspapers” — who deny they are in the midst of a cultural, political and existential war with Islam, of which terrorism is the flashiest, but ultimately least important component. Nonetheless, to give the reader a taste of what Muslim conquest can be like, in her first chapter, Fallaci provides a brief tour of the religion’s bloodiest imperial episodes and later does an amusing job of debunking some of its more exaggerated claims to cultural and scientific greatness.

The book is also animated by a world-class journalist’s dismay that she could have missed the story of her lifetime for as long as she did. In the 1960s and ’70s, when she was a Vietnam War correspondent and a legendarily ferocious interviewer — going mano a mano with the likes of Henry Kissinger and Yasser Arafat, Fallaci was simply too preoccupied with the events of the moment to notice that an entirely different narrative was rapidly taking shape — namely, the transformation of the West. There were clues, certainly. As when, in 1972, she interviewed the Palestinian terrorist George Habash, who told her (while a bodyguard aimed a submachine gun at her head) that the Palestinian problem was about far more than Israel. The Arab goal, Habash declared, was to wage war “against Europe and America” and to ensure that henceforth “there would be no peace for the West.” The Arabs, he informed her, would “advance step by step. Millimeter by millimeter. Year after year. Decade after decade. Determined, stubborn, patient. This is our strategy. A strategy that we shall expand throughout the whole planet.”

Fallaci thought he was referring simply to terrorism. Only later did she realize that he “also meant the cultural war, the demographic war, the religious war waged by stealing a country from its citizens … In short, the war waged through immigration, fertility, presumed pluriculturalism.” It is a low-level but deadly war that extends across the planet, as any newspaper reader can see.

Fallaci is not the first person to ponder the rapidity of the ongoing Muslim transformation of Europe. As the English travel writer Jonathan Raban wrote in Arabia: A Journey Through the Labyrinth (1979), in the mid-1970s Arabs seemed to arrive in London almost overnight. “One day Arabs were a remote people … camping out in tents with camels … the next, they were neighbors.” On the streets of West London appeared black-clad women adorned with beaked masks that made them look “like hooded falcons.” Dressed for the desert (and walking precisely four steps ahead of the women), Arab men bestrode the sidewalks “like a crew of escaped film extras, their headdresses aswirl on the wind of exhaust fumes.”

Writers far better acquainted with the Muslim world than Raban have been equally perplexed. In 1995, the late American novelist Paul Bowles, a longtime resident of Tangier, told me that he could not understand why the French had allowed millions of North African Muslims into their country. Bowles had chosen to live among Muslims for most of his life, yet he obviously considered it highly unlikely that so many of them could be successfully integrated into a modern, secular European state.

Perhaps Bowles would have been interested in this passage from Fallaci’s book: “In 1974 [Algerian President] Boumedienne, the man who ousted Ben Bella three years after Algerian independence, spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations. And without circumlocutions he said: ‘One day millions of men will leave the southern hemisphere of this planet to burst into the northern one. But not as friends. Because they will burst in to conquer, and they will conquer by populating it with their children. Victory will come to us from the wombs of our women.’ ”

Such a bald statement of purpose by a nation’s president before an international forum seems incredible. Yet even in British journalist Adam LeBor’s A Heart Turned East (1997), a work of profound, almost supine sympathy for the plight of Muslim immigrants in the West, a London-based mullah is quoted as saying, “We cannot conquer these people with tanks and troops, so we have got to overcome them by force of numbers.” In fact, such remarks are commonplace. Just this week, Mullah Krekar, a Muslim supremacist living in Oslo, informed the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten that Muslims would change Norway, not the other way around. “Just look at the development within Europe, where the number of Muslims is expanding like mosquitoes,” he said. “By 2050, 30 percent of the population in Europe will be Muslim.”

In other words, Europe will be conquered by being turned into “Eurabia,” which is what Fallaci believes it is well on the way to becoming. Leaning heavily on the researches of Bat Ye’or, author of Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, Fallaci recounts in fascinating detail the actual origin of the word “Eurabia,” which has now entered the popular lexicon. Its first known use, it turns out, was in the mid-1970s, when a journal of that name was printed in Paris (naturally), written in French (naturally), and edited by one Lucien Bitterlin, then president of the Association of Franco-Arab Solidarity and currently the Chairman of the French-Syrian Friendship Association. Eurabia (price, five francs) was jointly published by Middle East International (London), France-Pays Arabes (Paris), the Groupe d’Etudes sur le Moyen-Orient (Geneva) and the European Coordinating Committee of the Associations for Friendship with the Arab World, which Fallaci describes as an arm of what was then the European Economic Community, now the European Union. These entities, Fallaci says, not mincing her words, were the official perpetrators “of the biggest conspiracy that modern history has created,” and Eurabia was their house organ.

Briefly put, the alleged plot was an arrangement between European and Arab governments according to which the Europeans, still reeling from the first acts of PLO terrorism and eager for precious Arabian oil made significantly more precious by the 1973 OPEC crisis, agreed to accept Arab “manpower” (i.e., immigrants) along with the oil. They also agreed to disseminate propaganda about the glories of Islamic civilization, provide Arab states with weaponry, side with them against Israel and generally tow the Arab line on all matters political and cultural. Hundreds of meetings and seminars were held as part of the “Euro-Arab Dialogue,” and all, according to the author, were marked by European acquiescence to Arab requests. Fallaci recounts a 1977 seminar in Venice, attended by delegates from 10 Arab nations and eight European ones, concluding with a unanimous resolution calling for “the diffusion of the Arabic language” and affirming “the superiority of Arab culture.”

While the Arabs demanded that Europeans respect the religious, political and human rights of Arabs in the West, not a peep came from the Europeans about the absence of freedom in the Arab world, not to mention the abhorrent treatment of women and other minorities in countries like Saudi Arabia. No demand was made that Muslims should learn about the glories of western civilization as Europeans were and are expected to learn about the greatness of Islamic civilization. In other words, according to Fallaci, a substantial portion of Europe’s cultural and political independence was sold off by a coalition of ex-communists and socialist politicians. Are we surprised? Fallaci isn’t. In 1979, she notes, “the Italian or rather European Left had fallen in love with Khomeini just as now it has fallen in love with Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein and Arafat.”

Considerably less intemperate than her last book on the topic of radical Islam, the volcanically angry The Rage and the Pride, The Force of Reason is despairing, but often surprisingly funny. (“The rage and the pride have married and produced a sturdy son: the disdain,” she writes with characteristic wit.) And, Fallaci being Fallaci, it is occasionally over the top and will no doubt be deeply offensive to many, particularly when, in a postscript the book might have been better off without, she claims that there is no such thing as moderate Islam. Nonetheless, the voice and warmth and humor of the author light up its pages, particularly when she takes a leaf out of Saul Bellow’s Herzog by firing off impassioned letters to the famous both living and dead. She is savage about the Left, the “Peace” movement (war is a fundamental, if regrettable, condition of life, she states), the Catholic Church, the media and, of course, Islam itself, which she considers theological totalitarianism and a deadly threat to the world. She is much more optimistic about America than Europe, citing the bravery of New Yorkers who celebrated New Year’s Eve in Times Square despite widely publicized terrorism threats, but here one feels that she is clutching at straws. Though Fallaci now lives in New York, little amity has been extended to her by her peers since the post-9/11 publication of The Rage and the Pride, and she remains almost as much of a media pariah here as she does in Europe. The major difference is that we’re not putting her on trial.

As that Norwegian Mullah told Aftenposten, “Our way of thinking … will prove more powerful than yours.” One hopes he’s wrong, but if he is, it will be ordinary Americans and Europeans, including courageous Arab-Americans like L.A. resident Wafa Sultan and the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali (two women openly challenging Islamist supremacism), who prove him so, and not our intellectual classes (artists, pundits, filmmakers, actors, writers …). Many of the latter, consumed by Bush-hatred and cultural self-loathing, are perilously close to becoming today’s equivalent of the great Norwegian novelist Knut Hamsun, who so hated the British Empire that he sided with the Nazis in World War II, to his everlasting shame. The Force of Reason, at the very least, is a welcome and necessary antidote to the prevailing intellectual atmosphere.

Staff writer Brendan Bernhard is the author of White Muslim: From L.A. to New York to Jihad, a study of converts to Islam in the West (Melville House).

Posted in Europe, Islamofascism, Migrants, Muslims, Terrorism | 7 Comments »

Yes, This Is About Islam By SALMAN RUSHDIE

Posted by jagoindia on August 25, 2008


November 2, 2001

Yes, This Is About Islam
By SALMAN RUSHDIE

LONDON — “This isn’t about Islam.” The world’s leaders have been repeating this mantra for weeks, partly in the virtuous hope of deterring reprisal attacks on innocent Muslims living in the West, partly because if the United States is to maintain its coalition against terror it can’t afford to suggest that Islam and terrorism are in any way related.

The trouble with this necessary disclaimer is that it isn’t true. If this isn’t about Islam, why the worldwide Muslim demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda? Why did those 10,000 men armed with swords and axes mass on the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, answering some mullah’s call to jihad? Why are the war’s first British casualties three Muslim men who died fighting on the Taliban side?

Why the routine anti-Semitism of the much-repeated Islamic slander that “the Jews” arranged the hits on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, with the oddly self-deprecating explanation offered by the Taliban leadership, among others, that Muslims could not have the technological know-how or organizational sophistication to pull off such a feat? Why does Imran Khan, the Pakistani ex-sports star turned politician, demand to be shown the evidence of Al Qaeda’s guilt while apparently turning a deaf ear to the self-incriminating statements of Al Qaeda’s own spokesmen (there will be a rain of aircraft from the skies, Muslims in the West are warned not to live or work in tall buildings)? Why all the talk about American military infidels desecrating the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia if some sort of definition of what is sacred is not at the heart of the present discontents?

Of course this is “about Islam.” The question is, what exactly does that mean? After all, most religious belief isn’t very theological. Most Muslims are not profound Koranic analysts. For a vast number of “believing” Muslim men, “Islam” stands, in a jumbled, half-examined way, not only for the fear of God — the fear more than the love, one suspects — but also for a cluster of customs, opinions and prejudices that include their dietary practices; the sequestration or near-sequestration of “their” women; the sermons delivered by their mullahs of choice; a loathing of modern society in general, riddled as it is with music, godlessness and sex; and a more particularized loathing (and fear) of the prospect that their own immediate surroundings could be taken over — “Westoxicated” — by the liberal Western-style way of life.

Highly motivated organizations of Muslim men (oh, for the voices of Muslim women to be heard!) have been engaged over the last 30 years or so in growing radical political movements out of this mulch of “belief.” These Islamists — we must get used to this word, “Islamists,” meaning those who are engaged upon such political projects, and learn to distinguish it from the more general and politically neutral “Muslim” — include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the blood-soaked combatants of the Islamic Salvation Front and Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Shiite revolutionaries of Iran, and the Taliban. Poverty is their great helper, and the fruit of their efforts is paranoia. This paranoid Islam, which blames outsiders, “infidels,” for all the ills of Muslim societies, and whose proposed remedy is the closing of those societies to the rival project of modernity, is presently the fastest growing version of Islam in the world.

This is not wholly to go along with Samuel Huntington’s thesis about the clash of civilizations, for the simple reason that the Islamists’ project is turned not only against the West and “the Jews,” but also against their fellow Islamists. Whatever the public rhetoric, there’s little love lost between the Taliban and Iranian regimes. Dissensions between Muslim nations run at least as deep, if not deeper, than those nations’ resentment of the West. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to deny that this self-exculpatory, paranoiac Islam is an ideology with widespread appeal.

Twenty years ago, when I was writing a novel about power struggles in a fictionalized Pakistan, it was already de rigueur in the Muslim world to blame all its troubles on the West and, in particular, the United States. Then as now, some of these criticisms were well-founded; no room here to rehearse the geopolitics of the cold war and America’s frequently damaging foreign policy “tilts,” to use the Kissinger term, toward (or away from) this or that temporarily useful (or disapproved-of) nation-state, or America’s role in the installation and deposition of sundry unsavory leaders and regimes. But I wanted then to ask a question that is no less important now: Suppose we say that the ills of our societies are not primarily America’s fault, that we are to blame for our own failings? How would we understand them then? Might we not, by accepting our own responsibility for our problems, begin to learn to solve them for ourselves?

Many Muslims, as well as secularist analysts with roots in the Muslim world, are beginning to ask such questions now. In recent weeks Muslim voices have everywhere been raised against the obscurantist hijacking of their religion. Yesterday’s hotheads (among them Yusuf Islam, a k a Cat Stevens) are improbably repackaging themselves as today’s pussycats.

An Iraqi writer quotes an earlier Iraqi satirist: “The disease that is in us, is from us.” A British Muslim writes, “Islam has become its own enemy.” A Lebanese friend, returning from Beirut, tells me that in the aftermath of the attacks on Sept. 11, public criticism of Islamism has become much more outspoken. Many commentators have spoken of the need for a Reformation in the Muslim world.

I’m reminded of the way noncommunist socialists used to distance themselves from the tyrannical socialism of the Soviets; nevertheless, the first stirrings of this counterproject are of great significance. If Islam is to be reconciled with modernity, these voices must be encouraged until they swell into a roar. Many of them speak of another Islam, their personal, private faith.

The restoration of religion to the sphere of the personal, its depoliticization, is the nettle that all Muslim societies must grasp in order to become modern. The only aspect of modernity interesting to the terrorists is technology, which they see as a weapon that can be turned on its makers. If terrorism is to be defeated, the world of Islam must take on board the secularist-humanist principles on which the modern is based, and without which Muslim countries’ freedom will remain a distant dream.

Salman Rushdie is the author, most recently, of “Fury: A Novel.”

Posted in Islam, Islamofascism, Terrorism | Leave a Comment »

SIMI members using aliases to carry out Islamic terrorist activities

Posted by jagoindia on August 25, 2008


Also read

I knew Sajid as Saleem, says Ali

What’s in a name?
Sreenivas Janyala
Posted online: Monday, August 25, 2008

The suspects caught in connection with Ahmedabad blasts don’t ring a bell for Jaipur and Hyderabad police. The reason: each one of them has several aliases

Hyderabad, August 24: It is a complex brainteaser of finding out who is who. There are several names without faces. There are no photographs, not even a sketch. And each person has several aliases: the terror network knows him by one name, Hyderabad Police may know him by another name while Jaipur police may be looking for him with another. But the real identity is a mystery. And, with indications that the network of SIMI activists involved in Ahmedabad blasts could also be involved in blasts in Hyderabad, Jaipur and elsewhere, some of the best investigative teams are trying crack this name code, and join the dots that might give them a complete picture.

Armed with a few old photographs and a list of names, teams of Hyderabad Police are interrogating those arrested by the Ahmedabad Crime Branch in connection with the July 26 blasts. The Hyderabad Police are looking for clues and information that might help them crack the twin blasts of August 25 last year at Lumbini Park and Gokul Chat, and the Mecca Masjid blast last May.

With the trail of terror linking Azamgadh with Hyderabad, it is a painstaking work. The names of suspects that Hyderabad police have are not necessarily recognised by the accused arrested by Ahmedabad Crime Branch in connection. “On the other hand, the names that the accused are revealing may not ring a bell for the police. It is quite possible that the person may be the same but the police and the accused know him by different names. They have given themselves fake names for different purposes and are known by various aliases. So it is possible that police is looking for the same person that the accused are mentioning, but are finding it difficult to arrive at his real identity if photos are not available,” an officer said.

“We are exploring if those persons in custody of Ahmedabad police are involved in the Hyderabad blasts too, or they know of the persons who were involved. So far, the names or links are not falling into place,” says Hyderabad Police Commissioner B Prasada Rao.

“The dozen-odd persons arrested by the Ahmedabad Police also had given themselves aliases and throughout the operation they were known by that name only. Those who were involved in the operation did not know the real names of each other. Even during the training camps held in Kerala and Gujarat where persons from various states attended, they had fake names. In cases where we don’t have the suspects’ sketch or photograph, it is difficult to pin-point who is who,” says Joint Commissioner Ashish Bhatia. Bhatia says he has a strong hunch that the real identities of those behind Hyderabad and Jaipur blasts will emerge out of the interrogation of the persons arrested in connection with the Ahmedabad blasts.

Cops are sifting through old records, statements by persons arrested earlier or detained for questioning, and based on names and descriptions revealed by the accused in Ahmedabad, they are preparing profiles that might eventually help them in zeroing in on the real persons behind the blasts.

For instance, several names revealed by Hyderabad youth Raziuddin Nasir to Karnataka Police did not make sense to investigating agencies until the Ahmedabad Crime Branch interrogated some suspects after the blasts and realised that they were referring to the same people that Raziuddin Nasir mentioned, but with different names.

Based on the description given by one accused in Ahmedabad, the Hyderabad police questioned one student of Saidabad area on Thursday, but did not make much headway.

The Jaipur police have also picked up a couple of students whose identities were not clear to them before the Ahmedabad blasts arrests.

Officials said that though several persons suspected to be involved in Jaipur blasts could be identified based on the information provided by the accused in Ahmedabad, nothing has cropped up related to the Hyderabad blasts so far.

Posted in Ahmedabad, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Hyderabad, Islamofascism, Jaipur, Rajasthan, SIMI, State, Terrorism | Leave a Comment »

 
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